                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

        Argued November 1, 2001    Decided April 12, 2002 

                           No. 00-1443

                    Chelsea Industries, Inc., 
                            Petitioner

                                v.

                 National Labor Relations Board, 
                            Respondent

      International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
         Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, 
                    Intervenor for Respondent

            Petition for Review and Cross-Application 
               for Enforcement of an Order of the 
                  National Labor Relations Board

     Donald H. Scharg argued the cause for petitioner.  On the 
briefs were Steven J. Fishman and Thomas A. Pinch.

     Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, 
National Labor Relations Board, argued the cause for respon-
dent.  With her on the brief were Arthur F. Rosenfeld, 
General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Coun-
sel, and Joan E. Hoyte-Hayes, Attorney.  Frederick Havard, 
Supervisory Attorney, entered an appearance.

     James B. Coppess argued the cause for intervenor.  With 
him on the brief was Laurence Gold.

     Before:  Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Randolph, 
Circuit Judges.

       Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

     Ginsburg, Chief Judge:  Under longstanding precedent of 
the National Labor Relations Board, an employer may not, 
for a year after a union is certified as the bargaining repre-
sentative of its employees, withdraw recognition of the union 
on the ground that it has lost its majority support among the 
employees.  Chelsea Industries, Inc. petitions for review of 
the Board's decision extending this rule to prohibit an em-
ployer from withdrawing recognition after the certification 
year based upon evidence of less than majority support for 
the union that the employer acquired during the certification 
year.  We uphold the Board's new policy because it is both 
rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations 
Act.

                          I. Background

     In April, 1993 the Board certified the United Auto Workers 
as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of Chel-
sea's employees, and the two parties began to negotiate a 
collective bargaining agreement in February, 1994, which 
therefore marked the start of the Union's "certification year."  
In November, with negotiations still on-going, Chelsea's man-
agement received a petition subscribed by 57 of the Compa-
ny's 89 employees declaring that the "UNDERSIGNED EM-
PLOYEES ... DO NOT WANT TO BE REPRESENTED 
BY THE UAW."  Neither Chelsea nor the employees in-
formed the UAW of the petition, and the Company continued 

to negotiate with the Union--from all that appears, in good 
faith--until February, 1995.  The certification year then hav-
ing ended, Chelsea notified the Union that, based upon the 
November petition, it would no longer recognize the UAW as 
the bargaining representative of its employees.

     At the time that Chelsea withdrew recognition from the 
Union, 51 of the 57 signatories of the petition still worked 
there and constituted a majority of Chelsea's employees.  No 
outstanding allegations of unfair labor practices tainted Chel-
sea's withdrawal of recognition.

     Immediately after the withdrawal the UAW charged that 
Chelsea had violated ss 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
s 158(a)(1) & (5).  In March, 1995, when Chelsea increased 
its employees' wages, the UAW filed another unfair labor 
practice charge because the Company acted without first 
having bargained with the Union.  The General Counsel 
issued a complaint encompassing both charges.

     An Administrative Law Judge dismissed the complaint, 
rejecting the General Counsel's and the Union's argument 
that "an antiunion petition secured within the certification 
year can never be utilized to withdraw recognition outside the 
certification year."  Chelsea Indus., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 
184, slip op. at 7 (Aug. 31, 2001) (ALJ Decision).  The ALJ 
drew upon a line of cases in which the Board had suggested 
that an employer with evidence the union no longer has the 
support of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit 
lawfully may declare in advance its intention to withdraw 
recognition from the union at the end of the certification year.  
See, e.g., Rock-Tenn Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 670, 672 (1994).  The 
ALJ inferred that such cases also establish the lesser and 
seemingly included right of an employer with such evidence 
to withdraw recognition after the certification year without 
having made an announcement during the year, and that 
therefore Chelsea lawfully had withdrawn recognition of the 
UAW.  See Chelsea, slip op. at 7-8 (ALJ Decision).

     The Board reversed the ALJ's ruling, holding that an 
employer "may not withdraw recognition from a union outside 
of the certification year based on evidence received within the 

certification year."  Chelsea, slip op. at 4.  Accordingly, the 
Board held that Chelsea unlawfully had refused to bargain 
with the Union, from which it followed that its subsequent 
unilateral wage increase was unlawful as well.  Chelsea now 
petitions for review of that decision, and the Board cross-
applies for enforcement.

                           II. Analysis

     The Board has long held, with exceptions not applicable 
here, that an employer may not withdraw recognition from a 
union for at least a year following the union's certification.  
See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90, 92 (1945) 
("Board election and certification must be treated as identify-
ing the statutory bargaining agent with certainty and finality 
for a reasonable period of time--about a year, under ordinary 
circumstances").  After bargaining for a year an employer 
may withdraw recognition based upon actual evidence that a 
majority of its employees no longer support the union;  a 
petition signed by a majority is such evidence.  See Sullivan 
Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  The 
issue in this case, then, is whether the Board reasonably 
could hold, consistent with the Act, that an employer may not 
withdraw recognition based upon evidence secured during the 
certification year.

     We defer to the Board's interpretation of the Act if it is 
reasonable, see Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 
401 (1996), and "if the Board's 'explication is not inadequate, 
irrational, or arbitrary.' "  Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. 
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998).  The agency acts unreason-
ably if it departs from established policy without giving a 
reasoned explanation for the change, see ConAgra, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1443-44 (D.C. Cir. 1997), as Chelsea 
claims the Board did in this case.

     Fifteen years ago the Board ruled that an employer may 
not withdraw recognition from a union based upon evidence 
acquired during the certification year.  See United Super-
markets, 287 N.L.R.B. 119, 120 (1987) (just as anti-union 
petition could not "be acted upon by [employer] within the 
certification year, [employer] cannot subsequently rely on it 

to justify a more timely withdrawal of recognition"), aff'd, 
United Supermarkets v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1989).  
The ALJ declined for two reasons to recognize United Super-
markets as controlling here.  First, in that case the Board 
had faulted the employer not only for having withdrawn 
recognition from the union based upon evidence acquired 
during the certification year, but also for having acted upon 
an anti-union petition that was unreliable owing to the em-
ployer's outstanding unfair labor practices, see Chelsea, slip 
op. at 8 (ALJ Decision);  indeed, in United Supermarkets the 
Board had described the unremedied unfair labor practices as 
the "[m]ore significant" problem, 287 N.L.R.B. at 120.  There 
were no such allegations pending against Chelsea.  See Chel-
sea, slip op. at 8 (ALJ Decision).

     Second, the ALJ concluded that the Board's more recent 
decision in Rock-Tenn had undermined United Supermarkets.  
See id. at 7.  After all, an employer's right to announce in 
advance that it intended to withdraw recognition at the end of 
the certification year would seem to imply that the employer 
could simply withdraw recognition at the year's end without 
having issued such an anticipatory announcement.  The ALJ 
recognized that to allow an employer to act upon evidence 
acquired during the year "had the potential of rendering 
further bargaining within the year meaningless," id. at 8, but 
he was "not authorized" to depart from what he perceived to 
be a binding precedent of the Board, id.

     The Board labors under no such disability, of course, and it 
resolved the tension between United Supermarkets and 
Rock-Tenn by disavowing the later decision and ruling that 
"an employer may not withdraw recognition from a union 
outside of the certification year based on evidence received 
within the certification year."  Chelsea, slip op. at 4.  The 
Board justified its decision on the grounds that the rule 
announced in United Supermarkets relieves a newly certified 
union of "exigent pressures to produce hothouse results or be 
turned out" and decreases an employer's incentive to engage 
in surface bargaining, see id. at 3, the very grounds accepted 
by the Supreme Court when it first reviewed the Board's 
decision establishing the irrebuttable presumption that a un-

ion enjoys majority support during the certification year, see 
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954).  These reasons are 
equally applicable here:  an employer that acquires evidence 
its employees are dissatisfied with their union may well be 
reluctant to negotiate, and tempted instead merely to run out 
the certification year in the expectation that the employees 
will then oust the union;  and a union facing the threat of 
derecognition based upon dissatisfaction among its members 
during the certification year will again be under pressure to 
generate "hothouse results."  Therefore, we cannot conclude 
that the Board's prophylactic rule is irrational.

     Nor may we fault the Board for not following its own 
precedent.  The Board is at liberty to change its policies as 
long as it justifies the change with a "reasoned explanation," 
Micro Pacific Dev., Inc. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1325, 1336 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), and, as we have seen, it has met that obligation 
here.  The Board recognized that a conflict had emerged in 
its cases with regard to whether an employer may, after the 
certification year, withdraw recognition from a union based 
upon evidence the employer had acquired during the certifica-
tion year.  Although not directly in conflict, Rock-Tenn--in 
which the Board upheld an anticipatory withdrawal of recog-
nition--and United Supermarkets--in which the Board con-
demned a withdrawal of recognition deferred until the end of 
the certification year--could not sensibly co-exist.  The Board 
took this opportunity to relieve the tension, and it did so in 
favor of the Union rather than the Company.  Because, as 
described above, that resolution was itself reasonable, and the 
Board gave a "reasoned explanation" for changing (or per-
haps merely clarifying) its policy, we reject Chelsea's conten-
tion that the Board impermissibly departed from precedent.

     Equally unavailing is Chelsea's argument that the Board's 
decision conflicts with s 7 of the Act because it limits the 
employees' right "to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and ... to refrain from any or all 
of such activities."  29 U.S.C. s 157.  (In this vein, Chelsea 
asserts the decision forces its employees "to accept the UAW 
as their bargaining representative simply because they did 
not wait until February 3, 1995 to sign the petition.")  But 

that is the inevitable by-product of the Board's striking a 
balance between stability and employee free choice in labor 
relations, as it frequently must do.  See, e.g., Terrace Gar-
dens Plaza, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 F.3d 222, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
("contract bar rule").  Insofar as the decision makes it more 
difficult for the employees to terminate their representation 
by the Union, the burden is no greater than is entailed in the 
Board's policy that an employer may not withdraw recogni-
tion during the certification year, which policy has been 
recognized as valid under the Act for nearly fifty years.  See 
Brooks, 348 U.S. at 100.

     Finally, we reject out of hand Chelsea's rather silly sugges-
tion that the Board's decision is unreasonable because it 
conflicts with a memorandum issued by the General Counsel's 
Division of Advice in response to an inquiry from a Regional 
Director considering whether to pursue the complaint in a 
similar case then pending.  The General Counsel investigates 
and prosecutes unfair labor practices before the Board, see 29 
U.S.C. s 153(d);  he must also defend the decisions of the 
Board on review, regardless whether the Board adopted the 
view he expressed as a party before it.  See National Labor 
Relations Bd., Organization & Functions s 202, 32 Fed Reg. 
9588, 9588 (1967).  It is of no moment, therefore, what was 
the General Counsel's understanding of the case law before 
the present decision issued, and the court will take no note of 
it.

     Because Chelsea's withdrawal of recognition was unlawful, 
it necessarily follows that Chelsea violated the Act by unilat-
erally raising its employees' wages.  As Chelsea implicitly 
recognizes by its silence, an employer may not alter its 
employees' wages without first having bargained with their 
union and reached either an agreement or an impasse.  See 
29 U.S.C. s 158(d);  Daily News of Los Angeles v. NLRB, 73 
F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

                         III. Conclusion

     For the reasons stated above, we deny Chelsea's petition 
for review and grant the Board's cross-application for en-
forcement.

                                                So ordered.
     
                               