

JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

**In the Matter of  
A Complaint of Judicial  
Misconduct or Disability**

**Complaint No. DC-25-90032**

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of the complaint herein, filed against a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, it is

**ORDERED** that the complaint be dismissed for the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum.

The Circuit Executive is directed to send copies of this Order and accompanying Memorandum to the complainant, the subject judge, and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b); JUD. CONF. U.S., RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (2019), RULE 11(g)(2).

  
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Sri Srinivasan, Chief Judge

Date: April 24, 2026

**MEMORANDUM**

The complainant has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. For the following reasons, this misconduct complaint will be dismissed.

The complainant filed two appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but those appeals were dismissed based on the complainant's noncompliance with that court's orders. The complainant then came to the district court in this circuit and sued three Ninth Circuit employees in their official capacities for their role in the handling of the two dismissed appeals. The subject judge granted the motion to dismiss, determining that he lacked authority to direct the Ninth Circuit to adjudicate the complainant's cases differently. Additionally, to the extent the complainant attempted to state a damages claim, the subject judge determined that the defendants enjoyed sovereign immunity against damages claims arising from their official acts.

The complainant also filed a second suit in the district court involving different defendants and alleging age discrimination in employment. The complainant's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the second suit was handled by a different district court judge. That judge granted the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and directed the Clerk to assign the case to the subject judge as related to the first complaint. The case was subsequently assigned to the subject judge. The complainant then filed a pleading called "Entry of Default Judgment Rule 55(b)(1)" which was entered on the docket as a Motion for Entry of Default. The defendants sought an extension of time to respond to the complaint, which the subject judge granted. The subject judge subsequently denied the motion for default judgment. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. The subject judge

determined that the complainant had failed to plead a plausible claim for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and that she had not sufficiently alleged other independent claims. The complainant noted an appeal, and the court of appeals granted the defendants' motion for summary affirmance.

The complainant has now filed her second judicial misconduct complaint against the subject judge. Although the allegations are difficult to decipher, it appears that she raises three allegations. First, the complainant asserts that the subject judge improperly designated her "Entry of Default Judgment" as a "Motion." The complainant alleges that by failing to treat her filing as an entry of default judgment, the subject judge prolonged the litigation. Second, the complainant claims that because she filed her first misconduct complaint, the subject judge retaliated against her by improperly determining that her two cases were related. Finally, the complainant again alleges that the subject judge delayed consideration of the case as a result of an improper motive as evidenced by *ex parte* communications. The complainant also notes that "[t]his matter may require a transfer to another judicial counsel [sic] as authorized under ARTICLE VIII: MISCELLANEOUS RULES #26." The complainant specifically notes as reasons for a transfer: "no resolution in previous matter," the subject judge's alleged retaliation against her, and "an imbalance of the court's judicial ascending authority (lack conservative judges[])."

As a preliminary matter, there is no basis upon which a transfer request could be made and thus that request is denied.

Furthermore, the complainant's allegations against the subject judge are without merit. The Clerk's Office renaming the pleading from Entry of Default Judgment to a Motion for Entry of Default is not evidence of judicial misconduct. The docket reflects that the subject judge

properly considered the pleading before him, and this did not result in a delay in the consideration of the complainant's case. Thus, this allegation "lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred." See JUD. CONF. RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, Rule 11(c)(1)(D); see 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii).

To the extent the complainant is alleging that the subject judge retaliated against her because she filed her first misconduct complaint, that claim is also without merit. The basis for the complainant's retaliation claim is that the subject judge improperly determined that her two cases were related. As detailed in the memorandum dismissing the complainant's first complaint, it was another district court judge, not the subject judge, who determined that the cases were related and thus should both be assigned to the subject judge. See *In the Matter of A Complaint of Judicial Misconduct or Disability*, Nos. DC-24-90036 and 90037 (April 16, 2025) at 3. Similarly, this court previously rejected the complainant's allegation that the subject judge engaged in *ex parte* communications with the U.S. Attorney. See *Id.* at 2. Thus, these allegations will be dismissed, as they were in the first complaint, because they too "lack sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred." JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 11(c)(1)(D). See also *In the Matter of A Complaint*, Nos. DC-24-90036 and 90037.

Accordingly, because the complaint is “based on allegations lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred,” the complaint will be dismissed. JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 11(c)(1)(B) & (D); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(c) and JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 18(a), the complainant may file a petition for review by the Judicial Council for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any petition must be filed in the Office of the Circuit Executive for the D.C. Circuit within 42 days after the date of the dismissal order. JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 18(b).