

JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

**In the Matter of  
A Complaint of Judicial  
Misconduct or Disability**

**Complaint No. DC-24-90047**

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of the complaint herein, filed against a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, it is

**ORDERED** that the complaint be dismissed for the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum.

The Circuit Executive is directed to send copies of this Order and accompanying Memorandum to the complainant, the subject judge, and the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b); JUD. CONF. U.S., RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (2019), RULE 11(g)(2).

  
Sri Srinivasan, Chief Judge

Date: April 16, 2025

**MEMORANDUM**

The complainant has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. For the following reasons, this misconduct complaint will be dismissed.

The complainant filed a complaint against a technology company and a government agency, asserting claims under a variety of statutes, including the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. The subject judge dismissed the complainant's first amended complaint with prejudice as to his claims against the technology company but with leave to amend as to his claims against the government agency. The complainant appealed and ultimately filed in district court a second amended complaint against the government agency, which remains pending. The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the complainant's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the claims against the government agency are not final and the subject judge has not directed entry of final judgment. After the complainant filed a flurry of motions, the subject judge issued an order stating that, until the court ruled on the pending partial motion to dismiss and the motion for summary affirmance, the complainant was barred from filing any further motions without first seeking leave of the court.

The complainant has now filed his second judicial misconduct complaint (*see* DC-24-90038), this time against a different subject judge. As with the prior complaint, the bulk of the complaint appears to focus of the merits of the complainant's underlying case.

The complainant does, however, reference the subject judge in two places and makes identical allegations to those he made against the subject judge in DC-24-90038. First, the complainant alleges that the subject judge “has engaged ‘in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner’, . . . arguably through ‘intentional discrimination’ . . . but more significantly evincing a retaliatory motive.” Second, the complainant asserts that “[a]s evidenced in the record, [the subject judge] has ‘erected a novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim.’”

As in the prior complaint (DC-24-90038), the complainant alleges that the subject judge acted in an “egregious and hostile manner” and “erected a novel prudential standing principle” in order to avoid reaching the underlying merits of his claim. As with the first complaint, the complainant has failed to identify how the subject judge’s actions were hostile or egregious. Because these allegations lack any support apart from the complainant’s own beliefs, the allegations “lack[] sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred.” *See* JUD. CONF. RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, Rule 11(c)(1)(D); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii).

As to the allegation that the subject judge “erected a novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim,” that allegation is also without merit. First, the subject judge did not rely on standing principles as a basis for dismissing the claims against the technology company, and the complaint

against the government agency remains proceeding. Consequently, this allegation also “lack[s] sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred.” *See* JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 11(c)(1)(D); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii). Moreover, to the extent the complainant is challenging the basis of the subject judge’s rulings, that allegation amounts to a direct challenge to the merits of the subject judge’s orders and thus must be dismissed as “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 11(c)(1)(B); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii).

Accordingly, because the complaint is “directly related to the merits of a decision” and is “based on allegations lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred,” this complaint will be dismissed. JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 11(c)(1)(B) & (D); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(c) and JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 18(a), the complainant may file a petition for review by the Judicial Council for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any petition must be filed in the Office of the Circuit Executive for the D.C. Circuit within 42 days after the date of the dismissal order. JUDICIAL-CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS RULE 18(b).